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A function f∶{0,1}n→ {0,1} is called an approximate AND-homomorphism if choosing x,y∈n uniformly at random, we have that f(x∧ y) = f(x)∧ f(y) with probability at least 1−ε, where x∧ y = (x1∧ y1,…,xn∧ yn). We prove that if f∶ {0,1}n → {0,1} is an approximate AND-homomorphism, then f is δ-close to either a constant function or an AND function, where δ(ε) → 0 as ε→ 0. This improves on a result of Nehama, who proved a similar statement in which δ depends on n. Our theorem implies a strong result on judgement aggregation in computational social choice. In the language of social choice, our result shows that if f is ε-close to satisfying judgement aggregation, then it is δ(ε)-close to an oligarchy (the name for the AND function in social choice theory). This improves on Nehama’s result, in which δ decays polynomially with n. Our result follows from a more general one, in which we characterize approximate solutions to the eigenvalue equation f = λ g, where is the downwards noise operator f(x) = y[f(x ∧ y)], f is [0,1]-valued, and g is {0,1}-valued. We identify all exact solutions to this equation, and show that any approximate solution in which f and λ g are close is close to an exact solution. 

We propose a variant of the 2-to-1 Games Conjecture that we call the Rich 2-to-1 Games Conjecture and show that it is equivalent to the Unique Games Conjecture. We are motivated by two considerations. Firstly, in light of the recent proof of the 2-to-1 Games Conjecture, we hope to understand how one might make further progress towards a proof of the Unique Games Conjecture. Secondly, the new variant along with perfect completeness in addition, might imply hardness of approximation results that necessarily require perfect completeness and (hence) are not implied by the Unique Games Conjecture.